Reviewing the Security of an Informix Instance: A Read-Only Checklist
A repeatable way to review an Informix® server’s configuration, hardening and surroundings without changing anything, and how to record what you find so that the next review can be compared with this one.
Most Informix security problems are not exotic. They are a listener nobody
remembers opening, a trust file with a wildcard in it, a database where
PUBLIC can do more than anyone intended, or an audit setup that was
switched on once and never read. A checklist finds those. This article sets one
out in the order we work through it. It is the short guide. The full
Informix security review checklist, with every check, its
severity and fix, the read-only audit script that collects the evidence and a report
template, is in the Security Review section.
1. Ground rules
- Read-only. A review looks; it does not fix. Changes, restarts and secret rotation happen afterwards, on the owner’s instruction.
- No secrets in the report. Record where a password, key or keystore lives and who can read it, never its value.
- Record the evidence. For every finding keep the command or file that showed it, the date, and the product version. A finding with no evidence cannot be re-checked.
- Keep reports private. A review of a real system describes how to attack it. Store it outside any served directory and out of public repositories.
Parameter names and defaults differ between versions. Check each item against the documentation for the release you are reviewing, and say in the report which release that was.
2. Inventory first
You cannot review what you have not listed. Capture:
onstat - # engine up, mode, version banner
onstat -V # exact version and build
onstat -c # the onconfig actually in use
env | grep -E 'INFORMIX|ONCONFIG'
cat $INFORMIXSQLHOSTS # or $INFORMIXDIR/etc/sqlhosts
The engine finds the sqlhosts file through $INFORMIXSQLHOSTS, which holds
its full path. If that is not set, it uses $INFORMIXDIR/etc/sqlhosts.
The engine also recognizes a variable named $SQLHOSTS, but it has no
effect on where the file is read from, so a file named only through it is not the
one in use. Confirm which of the two the instance relies on before you review the
file.
Note the instance owner, the DBSA group, which onconfig file is live, and whether the server is a conventional (root-installed) or non-root installation. That last point changes which checks apply; see Informix Root vs Non-Root Installation and the companion privilege architecture article.
3. Network exposure
Start from what is really listening, then compare it with what the configuration says should be.
ss -ltnp | grep -E 'oninit|java' # every listening socket owned by the engine
onstat -g ntd # network connections and throughput by protocol
grep -E '^(DBSERVERNAME|DBSERVERALIASES)' $INFORMIXDIR/etc/$ONCONFIG
Questions to answer:
- Every
sqlhostsentry that is used: which protocol, which interface or host name, which port? Is each one needed? - Are SQLI and DRDA listeners both present when only one is used?
- Are the wire listeners (JSON, REST, MQTT), the cluster interconnect and any admin or monitoring ports bound to anything wider than they need to be, and what authentication do they use?
- Is the host firewall consistent with the list above, or does it simply allow everything on the internal network?
4. Trust and authentication
Informix has historically leaned on host-based trust, and that is where old installations are weakest.
- Trusted hosts and users. Review
/etc/hosts.equiv, per-user.rhostsand.netrcfiles, and anyr=option onsqlhostsentries. Treat a.netrcthe same way ashosts.equivand.rhosts: it can hold a host, a user and a password that a connection uses without asking anyone, so check the informix account and every application account for one. Look for wildcards, for hosts that no longer exist or no longer belong to you, and for stored passwords, and confirm who can read each file. - Remote trust configuration. Check whether the server is using
its own trusted-host files (the
REMOTE_SERVER_CFGandREMOTE_USERS_CFGfamily of parameters, withS6_USE_REMOTE_SERVER_CFG) rather than the operating-system files, and read what they contain. - How passwords are checked. Is authentication done by the operating system, by PAM, or by a custom module? Are there accounts with no password or shared accounts used by several applications?
- Local connections. Check how local (shared-memory or loopback) connections are authenticated. Convenient local access should be a conscious decision.
5. Administrative access
- Who is in the DBSA group? Membership is the engine’s administrator list. List the members and justify each one.
- The instance owner. Is it a dedicated account with no other
duties? Who can
suorsudoto it, and who knows its password? - Administrative mode. Is the set of users allowed in administrative mode what you expect?
- The SQL Admin API. Anyone who can run
sysadmintask functions can do much of whatonmodedoes. Check who has been granted access to thesysadmindatabase. - Members of the operating-system group
informix. List who belongs to the group and justify each member. Membership gives those users the same DBSA and superuser privileges as the userinformixitself, so treat the group as if it were the account. UNSECURE_ONSTAT. Check the onconfig value. Unset or0is the safe setting. When it is1, any operating-system user on the host can runonstatand see other sessions’ SQL text, including literals such as names, account numbers and passwords passed in statements. Treat a1as a finding unless every account on the host is trusted with that data (check CFG-04).
6. Database privileges
Do this per database, not per instance. Connect as a DBA and look at what
PUBLIC and the application users can actually do.
-- database-level privileges
SELECT * FROM sysusers ORDER BY usertype, username;
-- table-level grants held by PUBLIC
SELECT t.tabname, p.grantee, p.tabauth
FROM systabauth p JOIN systables t ON t.tabid = p.tabid
WHERE p.grantee = 'public' AND t.tabid > 99;
- Which users hold the database-level
DBAprivilege? Application accounts rarely need it. - Does
PUBLIChaveCONNECT, and on which tables does it have more thanSELECT? - Is the
NODEFDACenvironment setting used, so that new tables do not automatically grant privileges toPUBLIC? Check the environment of the sessions that create tables, not just yours. - Are roles used, or does every application account hold its grants directly? Roles make a review tractable; direct grants make it a spreadsheet.
- Which stored procedures and UDRs run with the owner’s authority, and who may execute them? Check any external (C or Java) routines separately, because they run code inside the server.
7. Auditing
Auditing is configured outside the main onconfig, in the audit configuration file
and through onaudit. A common finding is that it is either off or on
with a mask nobody has looked at since it was set up.
- Is auditing enabled at all, and is that a deliberate decision?
- Where are audit records written, who can read and delete them, and how much space do they have? What does the audit configuration do when the audit area is full?
- Which events does the active mask record? Does it cover logins, privilege changes and schema changes?
- Does anyone actually read the records, or ship them to a place the DBAs cannot alter?
8. Encryption
Treat in-transit and at-rest separately.
- In transit. Which
sqlhostsentries use TLS, and which carry traffic in the clear? Check the protocol versions and cipher list the server accepts, and where the keystore and its stash file live and who can read them. The detail is in Configuring and Troubleshooting TLS/SSL with Informix. - At rest. Is any storage encrypted, whether by the engine, the filesystem or the storage layer? If so, where do the keys live and who can obtain them? Backups need the same questions: are archives and logical-log backups encrypted, and who can read the files?
- Passwords on the wire. Check whether any client still connects with plain-text password handling on an unencrypted link.
9. File and operating-system permissions
ls -ld $INFORMIXDIR $INFORMIXDIR/etc $INFORMIXDIR/bin
ls -l $INFORMIXDIR/etc/$ONCONFIG $INFORMIXSQLHOSTS
ls -l /path/to/chunks/* # chunk files and raw devices
find $INFORMIXDIR -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 -ls # SUID / SGID files
- Chunk files and devices should be owned by the instance owner and not readable by other users: anyone who can read a chunk can read the data, whatever the database privileges say.
- The onconfig,
sqlhosts, trust files, keystore and stash must not be writable by anyone but their owner. - Compare the SUID and SGID files with what a clean installation of the same release contains. An extra one is a finding.
- Check the directories where the engine writes logs, dumps and core files, and who can read them. Diagnostic output often contains SQL text and data.
- Look at cron jobs and scripts run as the instance owner or as root against the instance: who can edit them, and do they embed passwords?
10. The surroundings
- Replication and clustering. How do primary and secondary servers authenticate each other, and is that link encrypted?
- Backups. Where do they go, who can restore them, and has a restore actually been tested?
- Patching. Which release and fix pack is running, and is it still supported? Compare against the vendor’s security bulletins.
- Client side. Which applications connect, from where, as which user? Credentials in application configuration files are part of the review.
11. Recording findings
Number each finding and give it the same fields every time, so that two reviews can be compared and a fix can be verified against the original evidence:
| ID | A stable number, never reused. |
| Severity | Based on who can exploit it and what they gain, not on how alarming it sounds. |
| Evidence | The exact command or file, the date and the version. |
| Impact | What an attacker or a mistake could do, in one or two sentences. |
| Remediation | The change that fixes it and the check that proves it is fixed. |
| Status | Open, accepted risk, or fixed with the date it was verified. |
Say plainly what you did not check. A review that covers the engine and not the backup server has not shown the backups are safe, and the report should not let a reader assume it has.
Limits of this checklist
This is a configuration and operations review. It does not test the engine for software vulnerabilities, and it is no substitute for patching. Treat it as a starting point and extend it with what your own estate requires.
For the numbered checks, the version matrix, the audit script and the report template, see the Informix security review and hardening checklist.