Please correct me: Informix security sucks
An ex-Oracle developer worried that Informix only enforces OS-level security, so a customer with root could inspect and copy his accounting application's table schema. Respondents corrected him: Informix does have database-level privileges (CONNECT plus table grants, revoking PUBLIC and using user/role-specific grants), though user 'informix' and anyone who can su to it has full access -- and root could read raw disk files under any engine, including Oracle, so DB privileges give a false sense of security. Several argued the schema is of limited value compared with application code and that hiding it blocks third-party reporting tools. The poster accepted the consensus and used it to persuade his management.
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Informix Dynamic Server 9.3 Ok, I am a converted oracle dork, so most of my posts start with: I know Oracle does this. This is bad because i really like Informix (I truely am a glutton for punishment). Oracle has security at the OS and Database level. All I can find from Informix is that they only have security at the OS level. SO, if you have root privileges for the OS, you can get into the tables of our product (which, obviously we dont want to happen). I work in a software development environment. We are creating an accounting product with a java front end, and an Informix back-end, which will be installed to a clients server via our Post sales support team. We've worked long and hard to get the DB model to where it is. If someone can get into the database from some 3rd party tool (DB access, etc.), they can take our tables and start an accounting company. I dont want this to happen; i'd much rather they pay me for my product. is there a way to keep them from doing this?
Greg Starnes wrote: > > Oracle has security at the OS and Database level. All I can find from > Informix is that they only have security at the OS level. SO, if you have > root privileges for the OS, you can get into the tables of our product > (which, obviously we dont want to happen). Having security at both os and database level seems complex. I like the Informix simplicity of having only OS level security. There's also a risk of duplication, where the database would implement services that can/are better provided by the OS. Maybe there exists for example a "crypto-filesystem" where the read/write's to files would be encrypted so you could have a layer of security (provided by the OS) like that. But I also sometimes worry about Informix security. Wouldn't informix SE security for Linux (I use SE, I don't know about Dynamic) be improved, by implementing communication IPC through simple pipes ? I don't need the remote capabilities of "sesoctcp" and I think both security and performance could be better if communication through pipes (seipcpip?) were supported. This is something that I worry about, that the informix daemon is listening on a socket and would accept connections; I'd rather have it listen only on a domain socket or pipe, but I don't think there's a way to do it right now.
My problem is that were using Informix for the back-end of a software package we are selling. Most of the value of this product is in the schema of the tables. If we set up this package on our clients computer (who will have root privelidges on the OS), they can go in and steal the layout of the tables. With Oracle, there is security at the DB level, so we can preset the privelidges on the tables, so that they cant get into them and rip them off (ie. take the schema and use it to set up thier own accounting dept (we are building an accounting package)). Am I going to have to tell my boss that Oracle is in fact superior... This could be a deal breaker for Informix, and I'd love to NOT see that happen. Thanks for your comments, it raises some interesting questions for our web server. "David Stes" <stes@pandora.be> wrote in message news:3908A205.93B8D4D7@pandora.be... > Greg Starnes wrote: > > > > Oracle has security at the OS and Database level. All I can find from > > Informix is that they only have security at the OS level. SO, if you have > > root privileges for the OS, you can get into the tables of our product > > (which, obviously we dont want to happen). > > Having security at both os and database level seems complex. > > I like the Informix simplicity of having only OS level security. > > There's also a risk of duplication, where the database would implement > services that can/are better provided by the OS. > > Maybe there exists for example a "crypto-filesystem" where the > read/write's to files would be encrypted so you could have a layer of > security (provided by the OS) like that. > > But I also sometimes worry about Informix security. > > Wouldn't informix SE security for Linux (I use SE, I don't know about > Dynamic) be improved, by implementing communication IPC through simple > pipes ? > > I don't need the remote capabilities of "sesoctcp" and I think both > security and performance could be better if communication through pipes > (seipcpip?) were supported. > > This is something that I worry about, that the informix daemon is > listening on a socket and would accept connections; I'd rather have it > listen only on a domain socket or pipe, but I don't think there's a way > to do it right now.
Are you planning on having database connections happen as a preset and/or hardocoded user-ID and password within your application, or will database connections be made on a user by user basis? If the former, you can set things up so only the specific application user-ID can connect to the database. I don't think you can stop user "informix" (considered *the* DBA/SA) from connecting. In any case, you would need root user permissions on your customers systems to create the special application user ID without them knowing the password. If you plan on individual user-IDs and passwords for each user for the database connections, then I'm afraid you're out of luck. I really question the practice of hiding the database from the customer however. A big part of the value of applications based on a relational DB is the ability to use a variety of third party tools for report generation, ad-hoc queries, etc. If you lock things up so tight that users cannot connect using ODBC or other methods outside of your application, then you stop them from using any of these packages. Personally, I would not recommend a package that locked the data up in some sort of proprietary or inaccessible (outside of the application) format to any of my clients. IMHO I don't think you should be too conerned about letting clients/users know the data structures you are using. A tremendous portion of the value of any software package is in the code itself. Just knowing the data structures is not enough to make reverse engineering easy, unless the business logic you are implementing is trivial. In that case the value of the entire application would be questionable. In article <8ea9k0$kv5$1@paxfeed.eni.net>, "Greg Starnes" <gstarnes@ep-services.com> wrote: > My problem is that were using Informix for the back-end of a software > package we are selling. Most of the value of this product is in the schema > of the tables. If we set up this package on our clients computer (who will > have root privelidges on the OS), they can go in and steal the layout of the > tables. > > With Oracle, there is security at the DB level, so we can preset the > privelidges on the tables, so that they cant get into them and rip them off > (ie. take the schema and use it to set up thier own accounting dept (we are > building an accounting package)). > > Am I going to have to tell my boss that Oracle is in fact superior... This > could be a deal breaker for Informix, and I'd love to NOT see that happen. > > Thanks for your comments, it raises some interesting questions for our web > server. > > "David Stes" <stes@pandora.be> wrote in message > news:3908A205.93B8D4D7@pandora.be... > > Greg Starnes wrote: > > > > > > Oracle has security at the OS and Database level. All I can find from > > > Informix is that they only have security at the OS level. SO, if you > have > > > root privileges for the OS, you can get into the tables of our product > > > (which, obviously we dont want to happen). > > > > Having security at both os and database level seems complex. > > > > I like the Informix simplicity of having only OS level security. > > > > There's also a risk of duplication, where the database would implement > > services that can/are better provided by the OS. > > > > Maybe there exists for example a "crypto-filesystem" where the > > read/write's to files would be encrypted so you could have a layer of > > security (provided by the OS) like that. > > > > But I also sometimes worry about Informix security. > > > > Wouldn't informix SE security for Linux (I use SE, I don't know about > > Dynamic) be improved, by implementing communication IPC through simple > > pipes ? > > > > I don't need the remote capabilities of "sesoctcp" and I think both > > security and performance could be better if communication through pipes > > (seipcpip?) were supported. > > > > This is something that I worry about, that the informix daemon is > > listening on a socket and would accept connections; I'd rather have it > > listen only on a domain socket or pipe, but I don't think there's a way > > to do it right now. > > -- Irwin Goldstein Objective Software Systems, Inc. http://www.objectsoft.com Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/ Before you buy.
I am so tired of 'we have to run as root' excuses for poor architecture and design. And yes there is security, just make another user with low permissions. -- --------------------------------------------------------- Steven Hauser email: hause011@tc.umn.edu URL: http://www.tc.umn.edu/~hause011 ---------------------------------------------------------
So exactly how does database permissions prevent a user with root access from directly reading the catalog information from the disk bypassing the database engine. Unless encrypted this would be trivial. I believe Oracle does document the layout of their disk structures. It would be easy to write a utility to dump the system catalog information. I don't want to argue which product is superior but I will say that having a feature that provides a false sense of security does not make any product superior. Greg Starnes wrote: > My problem is that were using Informix for the back-end of a software > package we are selling. Most of the value of this product is in the schema > of the tables. If we set up this package on our clients computer (who will > have root privelidges on the OS), they can go in and steal the layout of the > tables. > > With Oracle, there is security at the DB level, so we can preset the > privelidges on the tables, so that they cant get into them and rip them off > (ie. take the schema and use it to set up thier own accounting dept (we are > building an accounting package)). > > Am I going to have to tell my boss that Oracle is in fact superior... This > could be a deal breaker for Informix, and I'd love to NOT see that happen. > > Thanks for your comments, it raises some interesting questions for our web > server. > > "David Stes" <stes@pandora.be> wrote in message > news:3908A205.93B8D4D7@pandora.be... > > Greg Starnes wrote: > > > > > > Oracle has security at the OS and Database level. All I can find from > > > Informix is that they only have security at the OS level. SO, if you > have > > > root privileges for the OS, you can get into the tables of our product > > > (which, obviously we dont want to happen). > > > > Having security at both os and database level seems complex. > > > > I like the Informix simplicity of having only OS level security. > > > > There's also a risk of duplication, where the database would implement > > services that can/are better provided by the OS. > > > > Maybe there exists for example a "crypto-filesystem" where the > > read/write's to files would be encrypted so you could have a layer of > > security (provided by the OS) like that. > > > > But I also sometimes worry about Informix security. > > > > Wouldn't informix SE security for Linux (I use SE, I don't know about > > Dynamic) be improved, by implementing communication IPC through simple > > pipes ? > > > > I don't need the remote capabilities of "sesoctcp" and I think both > > security and performance could be better if communication through pipes > > (seipcpip?) were supported. > > > > This is something that I worry about, that the informix daemon is > > listening on a socket and would accept connections; I'd rather have it > > listen only on a domain socket or pipe, but I don't think there's a way > > to do it right now.
Greg Starnes schrieb: > All I can find from > Informix is that they only have security at the OS level. SO, if you have > root privileges for the OS, you can get into the tables of our product > (which, obviously we dont want to happen). That is not quite true. There are no special permissions for root for access to Informix databases. Of course, root can access any data on the OS level, but that won't do him much good because all he will see is a bunch of binary garbage that is rather difficult to decode. It CAN be done, but that would require intimate knowledge of the internal workings of Informix. > If someone can get into > the database from some 3rd party tool (DB access, etc.), they can take our > tables and start an accounting company. I dont want this to happen; i'd > much rather they pay me for my product. is there a way to keep them from > doing this? To get "into the database", a user needs at least a CONNECT privilege. To access data in a table, he needs additional privileges on the table level. The only user who has access to everything without special privileges is "informix". AFAIK, having a user "informix" and a group "informix" is a prerequisite for running the Informix backend, so root could always do a "su - informix" to access the data. So there is no way to handle the database as a "black box" the way you would like to have it. On the other hand, I would be very hesitant to buy an accounting package that stores its data in such a black box. And are you sure that Oracle would permit you to do this? Regards, Richard -- +--------------------------+------------------------------------------+ | Dr. med Richard Spitz | INTERNET: spitz@ana.med.uni-muenchen.de | | EDV-Gruppe Anaesthesie | Tel : +49-89-7095-6110 | | Klinikum Grosshadern | FAX : +49-89-7095-6420 | | 81366 Munich, Germany | GSM : +49-172-8933578 | +--------------------------+------------------------------------------+
Maybe it makes sense just to patent your schema? Even if security of DB engine is very high it is always possible to huck into the level of DB schema. And if patented it will be harder to steal. Yuri. Greg Starnes wrote: > Informix Dynamic Server 9.3 > > Ok, I am a converted oracle dork, so most of my posts start with: I know > Oracle does this. This is bad because i really like Informix (I truely am a > glutton for punishment). > > Oracle has security at the OS and Database level. All I can find from > Informix is that they only have security at the OS level. SO, if you have > root privileges for the OS, you can get into the tables of our product > (which, obviously we dont want to happen). > > I work in a software development environment. We are creating an accounting > product with a java front end, and an Informix back-end, which will be > installed to a clients server via our Post sales support team. We've worked > long and hard to get the DB model to where it is. If someone can get into > the database from some 3rd party tool (DB access, etc.), they can take our > tables and start an accounting company. I dont want this to happen; i'd > much rather they pay me for my product. is there a way to keep them from > doing this?
I don't understand how Oracle is more secure. Won't they have a DBA who knows the system or sys account passwords? Once you know those, your in regardless of what other account privileges you set up. Greg Starnes wrote in message <8ea9k0$kv5$1@paxfeed.eni.net>... >My problem is that were using Informix for the back-end of a software >package we are selling. Most of the value of this product is in the schema >of the tables. If we set up this package on our clients computer (who will >have root privelidges on the OS), they can go in and steal the layout of the >tables. > >With Oracle, there is security at the DB level, so we can preset the >privelidges on the tables, so that they cant get into them and rip them off >(ie. take the schema and use it to set up thier own accounting dept (we are >building an accounting package)). > >Am I going to have to tell my boss that Oracle is in fact superior... This >could be a deal breaker for Informix, and I'd love to NOT see that happen.
Thanks for everyones reply. I really understood the situation to be exactly what everyone said: the schema should be open. People can get to it if they really wanted to anyways. But who would care. Im SURE that none of you would. I was really looking for fuel to tell my bosses what they want really won't work. This string of posts will do the trick VERY WELL!! Thanks again. Greg "Greg Starnes" <gstarnes@ep-services.com> wrote in message news:8e9vi3$ei3$1@paxfeed.eni.net... > Informix Dynamic Server 9.3 > > Ok, I am a converted oracle dork, so most of my posts start with: I know > Oracle does this. This is bad because i really like Informix (I truely am a > glutton for punishment). > > Oracle has security at the OS and Database level. All I can find from > Informix is that they only have security at the OS level. SO, if you have > root privileges for the OS, you can get into the tables of our product > (which, obviously we dont want to happen). > > I work in a software development environment. We are creating an accounting > product with a java front end, and an Informix back-end, which will be > installed to a clients server via our Post sales support team. We've worked > long and hard to get the DB model to where it is. If someone can get into > the database from some 3rd party tool (DB access, etc.), they can take our > tables and start an accounting company. I dont want this to happen; i'd > much rather they pay me for my product. is there a way to keep them from > doing this? > >
Remove PUBLIC priveleges from your database and tables and make the priveleges user or role specific. This will give you even better protection than Oracle. Art S. Kagel Greg Starnes wrote: > Informix Dynamic Server 9.3 > > Ok, I am a converted oracle dork, so most of my posts start with: I know > Oracle does this. This is bad because i really like Informix (I truely am a > glutton for punishment). > > Oracle has security at the OS and Database level. All I can find from > Informix is that they only have security at the OS level. SO, if you have > root privileges for the OS, you can get into the tables of our product > (which, obviously we dont want to happen). > > I work in a software development environment. We are creating an accounting > product with a java front end, and an Informix back-end, which will be > installed to a clients server via our Post sales support team. We've worked > long and hard to get the DB model to where it is. If someone can get into > the database from some 3rd party tool (DB access, etc.), they can take our > tables and start an accounting company. I dont want this to happen; i'd > much rather they pay me for my product. is there a way to keep them from > doing this?