Informix Security Review: Method and Severity
What the review covers, how severity is set, and how an engagement runs.
One check catalogue, one evidence collector, two outputs: an internal hardening worklist and a customer-facing findings report. Every check has a stable ID (e.g. CFG-01) used by both this document and the ifx_secaudit.sh script, so a finding in the CSV maps straight to its rationale and remediation here.
- Versions covered: Informix 11.50, 11.70, 12.10, 14.10 and 15.0. The script decides applicability by whether a parameter or catalog table exists on the instance, not by hard-coded version gates, so a check that does not apply reports
NArather than a false failure. - Platforms: UNIX/Linux (AIX, Solaris, HP-UX, Linux). Windows installs are out of scope for the script; the catalogue checks C–G still apply.
- In scope: the server installation, onconfig, sqlhosts and listeners, authentication and user mapping, privileges in every database, extensibility (UDRs, SPL, sysdbopen), data at rest and backups, auditing, HA/ER links, patch level.
- Out of scope: application code, client-side connection strings, general OS hardening beyond what touches Informix, and penetration testing of the listeners (offer separately).
The script is read-only: it runs onstat, onaudit -c/-o and SELECT/UNLOAD statements, and never changes configuration.
Severity is set by what an attacker gains and how easily, then adjusted by context (data sensitivity, network exposure). The script assigns a default severity; the reviewer may raise or lower it with a one-line justification.
| Severity | Meaning | Typical Informix example | Customer SLA (suggested) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | Unauthenticated access or OS command execution as informix/root | Unpatched wire listener (CVE-2026-13476); + in hosts.equiv | Fix before next business day |
| High | Any authenticated user can escalate to DBA/DBSA or read all data | PUBLIC granted DBA; PUBLIC USAGE ON LANGUAGE C; world-writable chunk | 30 days |
| Medium | Weakens a control or exposes data in transit/at rest | Cleartext listeners on routable interfaces; no auditing | 90 days |
| Low | Defence-in-depth gap | DB_LIBRARY_PATH unset with no external UDRs | Next maintenance window |
| Info | Inventory or context for the reviewer | List of DBA users, setuid inventory | None |
Script status values: PASS, FAIL, WARN (needs judgement), MANUAL (evidence collected, human decision), NA (not applicable to this version or config), ERROR (could not collect).
Each reported finding carries: ID, title, severity, affected object (instance/database/file), evidence (exact command output or row), risk in one sentence, remediation, and a verification step.
- Pre-engagement (customer only). Agree scope (instances, hosts, databases), a named contact with OS access, and data-handling terms: the evidence bundle contains user names, grants and config, but no table data.
- Interview (30–45 min). Who connects and how (apps, ETL, DBAs, vendors); which data is regulated; HA/ER topology; backup targets; whether auditing is required by policy; any non-root install.
- Collect. Run
ifx_secaudit.shas user informix (or the DBSA in a non-root install) once per instance. Optionally run once as root to add the checks informix cannot see (/etc/shadowlock state,/etc/informix/allowed.surrogates, other users'.rhosts). - Analyse. Triage every
FAIL,WARNandMANUALrow against this catalogue. Confirm context: a cleartext listener bound to 127.0.0.1 is not a finding. - Report. Internal: export findings CSV to the tracker. Customer: fill the report template (last section), executive summary first.
- Retest. Re-run the script after remediation; the diff of two CSVs is the retest evidence.