Informix Security Review: Example Results
What a run of ifx_secaudit.sh reports on a real instance that was never hardened, and how to read it.
The numbers below come from a read-only run against a development instance on Informix 14.10.FC13W7. It had been used for testing and not hardened, so most of the findings are the ordinary ones. Host, server, database, table and path names are changed; counts, severities and check IDs are as the script reported them.
1. The summary
summary.txt is the page to read first. It counts every result by status and
by severity, then lists each Critical and High failure:
ifx_secaudit 1.2
Host: dbhost1
Server: ifxprod
Version: 14.10.FC13W7
Run as: informix
By status:
FAIL 53
MANUAL 102
PASS 55
WARN 11
FAIL/WARN by severity:
Critical 1
High 27
Medium 32
Low 3
Info 1
MANUAL rows are not failures: the script collected the evidence and a
person has to decide. Of the 53 failures, 28 are Critical or High. They fall into four
groups.
2. Critical: patch the wire listener
| ID | Severity | Object | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
NET-05 | Critical | wire listener | Running on 14.10.FC13W7: vulnerable to CVE-2026-13476 (fix 14.10.xC13W13 / 15.0.1.13; none for 12.10) |
NET-05 | High | jsonListener-example.properties | Wire listener authentication not enabled |
Fix this one first. The listener is a network service, the CVE is an unauthenticated command injection, and the properties file shows authentication is off as well. Patch to the fixed level, switch authentication on, and firewall the port. If the listener is not needed, stop it. See the checklist article.
3. High: PUBLIC privileges
Most of the High rows are the same finding repeated per database:
| ID | Severity | Object | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
PRIV-01 | High | sales | PUBLIC holds RESOURCE |
PRIV-03 | High | sales | 478 tables with PUBLIC write/alter privileges, e.g. customers: su-idx--- orders: su-idx--- items: su-idx--- |
PRIV-04 | Medium | sales | 479 tables readable by PUBLIC |
PRIV-03 | High | stores | 63 tables with PUBLIC write/alter privileges, e.g. product: su-idx--- region: su-idx--- |
PRIV-03 | High | test1 | 1 tables with PUBLIC write/alter privileges, e.g. orders: su-idx--- |
Across the instance, 22 databases carry PRIV-03, 19 carry PRIV-04 and 3 carry PRIV-01. The cause is
almost always the default: NODEFDAC is no (see the
next section), so every table created gets PUBLIC privileges, and nobody
revoked them. The privilege string su-idx--- reads as
select, update, insert, delete and
index: anyone who can connect can change the data.
The usual fix, per database, as its DBA:
REVOKE RESOURCE FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE ALL ON customers FROM PUBLIC; -- repeat per table the script lists
GRANT SELECT ON customers TO reporting; -- then grant back what is needed
evidence/data/<db>_public_write.txt lists every table behind each
count, so the list of tables to revoke is already written.
Two rows to read with care. PRIV-03 also appears for system databases such
as sysmaster and sysadmin: check the table list before revoking
anything there. And a database full of test tables is not the same as production data,
so the severity tells you what the finding is, not what the data is worth.
4. High: the install path
OS-01 | High | /opt/informix | Insecure path components: /opt/informix (drwxrwxr-x informix) |
The installation directory is group-writable. Anyone in the group can replace a binary
that runs as informix or, through a setuid helper, as root. Remove group
write (chmod g-w) unless there is a reason for it.
5. Medium: configuration, network, auditing
| ID | Object | Detail | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
CFG-01 | DB_LIBRARY_PATH | Not set: external modules may load from any path | Set it to the directories you load UDR libraries from |
CFG-03 | DBCREATE_PERMISSION | Not set: any user can create databases | Set DBCREATE_PERMISSION informix, and one line per allowed user |
CFG-13 | NODEFDAC | Set to 'no' | Set NODEFDAC yes, so new tables do not get PUBLIC privileges. This is the cause of most of section 3 |
NET-01 | ifxprod_net (onsoctcp *:9088) | Cleartext TCP listener on routable address | Add an SSL listener (onsocssl) and move clients to it |
NET-01 | ifxprod_drda (drsoctcp *:9090) | Cleartext TCP listener on routable address | As above, or restrict to a trusted network |
AUD-01 | auditing | Auditing disabled (ADTMODE 0) | Enable auditing and define masks. Start with failed connects, GRANT/REVOKE and DDL |
6. The same findings as a file
Every row above is a line in findings.csv, for a tracker or a report:
id,severity,status,object,detail
NET-05,Critical,FAIL,"wire listener","running on 14.10.FC13W7: vulnerable to CVE-2026-13476 ..."
PRIV-01,High,FAIL,"sales","PUBLIC holds RESOURCE"
CFG-13,Medium,FAIL,"NODEFDAC","Set to 'no'"
AUD-01,Medium,FAIL,"auditing","Auditing disabled (ADTMODE 0)"
7. Suggested order
- Patch and lock down the wire listener (
NET-05). - Set
NODEFDAC yes,DBCREATE_PERMISSIONandDB_LIBRARY_PATH, so the findings stop growing. - Revoke PUBLIC privileges database by database, using the evidence lists.
- Fix the install path and add SSL listeners.
- Turn on auditing, then run the script again and compare the two
findings.csvfiles (see retesting).